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Preface 
This paper reviews the current state of the debate on EU budget and policy reform, 
focusing in particular on the future of Cohesion policy after 2013. The paper was prepared 
by the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) under the aegis of EoRPA (European 
Regional Policy Research Consortium), which is a grouping of national government 
authorities from countries across Europe. The Consortium provides sponsorship for the EPRC 
to undertake regular monitoring and comparative analysis of the regional policies of 
European countries and the inter-relationships with EU Cohesion and Competition policies. 
EoRPA members currently comprise the following partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Sisäasiainministeriö (Ministry of the Interior), Helsinki 
 
France 
x Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement et à la compétitivité des territoires 
(DIACT), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Labour), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Arbeit, Freistaat Thüringen, Erfurt 
 
Italy 
x Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo e Coesione (Department for Cohesion and 
Development Policies), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Rozwojce Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
United Kingdom 
x Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, London 
x The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
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Ideas for Budget and Policy Reform: 
Reviewing the Debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+ 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the past year, the debate on the EU budget  and the longer term development of the 
European Union  has come to life. This paper reviews the evolution of the debate, with 
respect to the two consultations on the budget and specifically on Cohesion policy. 
The Budget Review 
This review was launched by the Commission President in September 2007 with a 
consultation paper described as a unique opportunity. The review has prompted extensive 
academic and policy debate on the future political and policy direction of the EU.  
Reviewing the main research contributions, the primary conclusion is the need for change. 
There is general recognition that the structure of the budget does not reflect the EUs 
political objectives and policy priorities. In broad terms, the consultation indicates a need 
for increased spending on the environment, energy and competitiveness, research and 
knowledge  as well as greater cross-policy coherence in meeting EU goals in these areas  
and a reduction or reorientation of CAP spending towards rural development and other 
contemporary policy objectives.  
On the revenue side of the budget, the budget debate has promoted extensive discussion of 
the own resources of the EU. There is considerable support for some kind of EU tax, but 
others are strongly opposed on theoretical, empirical and political grounds. While there is a 
widespread view that correction mechanisms should be avoided, it is also recognised that 
some method for dealing with Member State concerns on net balances is required. 
The budget review has prompted contributions on how to manage change to the budget and 
EU policies. Many contributors place emphasis on better independent assessment and 
understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of policies (notably impact) as part of a 
more structured and systematic approach to making expenditure decisions. 
The final issue considered by academic commentators are scenarios for change, focusing on 
how things might develop in practice. Although many commentators have stressed the 
importance of going beyond the status quo, it has been noted that radical change is 
unlikely. Several scenarios provide some insight into the possible financial parameters for 
the proposals made in the budget review. 
Turning to Member State perspectives, there are fundamental differences between Member 
States on the size of the EU budget. A range of principles have been put forward as a basis 
for future policy priorities  added value, solidarity, proportionality, subsidiarity. A similar 
set of principles is suggested for management of the budget as a whole  equity, 
transparency, efficiency/effectiveness and simplicity. The submissions from Member States 
suggest they see little need for more flexibility in the EU budget. They are also keen to 
avoid making significant changes to the 2007-13 financial framework. 
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There is universal support among Member States for decisions on future EU policies to be 
based on their European added value.  There also appears to be considerable consensus on 
policy priorities. Every Member State supports more emphasis on research and innovation, 
as well as EU-level action on environment and energy issues. Member States largely agree 
on the importance of the EUs external and internal policies in promoting political stability 
in neighbouring countries, international development and addressing terrorism, 
transnational crime, and migration. However, several are concerned about the implications 
of these priorities for the EU budget. 
Finally, there is little consensus on how the EU should generate revenue. On the one hand, 
there is some support for an EU tax, but other countries are ambivalent. A key principle for 
many Member States is that there should be fairness in their budget contributions. Most 
are opposed to special corrections, although some acknowledge that a balancing 
mechanism will be necessary. 
The Cohesion policy reform debate 
The debate on the future of Cohesion policy post 2013 was formally launched with the 
publication of the European Commissions Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion. 
With respect to the Commissions perspective on the future of policy, speeches by the 
Commissioner highlight several issues. First, regional development in Europe and the role of 
Cohesion policy must been seen within the context of global challenges. Second, Cohesion 
policy must be more focused on maximising its impact on EU competitiveness, growth and 
jobs. Third, changes are required to the governance of Cohesion policy in order to increase 
the focus on performance, to optimise the roles of different actors and levels, and to 
improve the coordination of the funds.  
Just over half of the Member States made a formal submission to the consultation, and 
others have sketched out their views in other fora. Most have welcomed the launch of the 
debate on the future of Cohesion policy, with some stressing that it must be seen within 
the context of the broader EU budget review debate.  
Policy rationale. Solidarity is widely held up as a fundamental EU value which is being 
suitably applied through Cohesion policy and that this expression of solidarity should not be 
put into question in the future. There is broad agreement that Cohesion policy has made a 
positive contribution to the reduction of disparities across EU Member States and regions by 
promoting economic growth, employment and competitiveness. Some countries recognise 
that the economic benefits of Cohesion policy do not accrue solely to the poorer regions 
and Member States of the EU, but also spread to the more prosperous parts. Further, 
beyond the contribution to EU-level objectives and goals, Cohesion policy is recognised as 
having important positive influences on a range of domestic institutions, processes and 
policies. Looking to the future there is an increasing recognition of the need for Cohesion 
policy to be more firmly targeted on European added value. 
Territorial cohesion. Member States are divided over the implications of territorial 
cohesion for the scope of Cohesion policy, financial allocations and the related 
responsibilities of different territorial levels. While some see no reason to change the remit 
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of the policy, others regard territorial cohesion as a means to provide additional measures 
and/or greater recognition of development challenges associated with specific territorial 
features. 
Spatial eligibility. There is widespread agreement that the focus of support should be on 
the less-developed regions. Some countries have expressed support for a smaller share of 
funding to be available for all EU regions in order to promote competitiveness and jobs. 
There are also differences on the use of designation indicators. 
Thematic priorities and challenges. There is widespread support for continued, if not 
increased, alignment of Cohesion policy with the major objectives and strategic 
development priorities of the EU through the Lisbon Strategy. However, there is no 
consensus on the role of Cohesion policy in addressing major challenges such as 
globalisation, climate change, demographic change and energy security.  
Management and implementation. A large number of Member States have revealed 
significant dissatisfaction with the complexity and administrative burdens involved and 
pointed to the need for change, particularly by applying the principles of simplification and 
proportionality to a more meaningful extent than has been the case to date. The most 
burdensome area of policy administration concerns the rules on financial management, 
audit and control. Various Member States acknowledged subsidiarity as the guiding principle 
to underpin future reforms to the management of Cohesion policy. There is also a desire to 
make the more performance and results oriented. Lastly, the need for better policy 
coordination and integration across funds is highlighted, as well as improved coherence 
with other EU and national policies.  
Future eligibility for Cohesion policy 
In the context of budgetary politics an important issue is the future eligibility for Cohesion 
policy. The distribution of funding for the 2007-13 period was principally based on GDP data 
for 2000-2 and GNI data for 2001-3. Data for three subsequent years has now been 
published and this already suggests some significant shifts in eligibility for the Convergence 
objective.   
An updated EPRC analysis suggests that Convergence region coverage would become much 
more heavily concentrated in the new Member States. Although some EU12 regions would 
lose eligibility, the changes are not large compared with those in the EU15. Greece, 
Portugal and Italy would be the only countries with significant Convergence region 
coverage. By comparison, the position for the Cohesion Fund is relatively stable. 
Discussion issues 
On the basis of the review of the budget and Cohesion policy consultations in this report, 
the following questions/issues are a starting point for discussion at the EoRPA meeting. 
x What role should Cohesion policy have in dealing with new challenges?  
x How should the added value of EU intervention be judged?  
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x How can the management and implementation of Cohesion policy be improved? 
x How might a more performance-based Cohesion policy operate? 
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Ideas for Budget and Policy Reform: 
Reviewing the Debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past year, the debate on the EU budget  and the longer term development of the 
European Union  has come to life. Triggered by the Commissions consultation on the 
budget review, Member States, European institutions, subnational authorities, think tanks 
and interest groups have all contributed to research and debate on a possible reshaping of 
the EUs finances, on the expenditure and revenue sides, the way in which financial 
planning is conducted, and the policy priorities after 2013. 
In parallel, a consultation on the future of Cohesion policy has also been underway, 
initiated by questions in the Fourth Cohesion Report. This has similarly encouraged 
discussion and the development of policy ideas, addressing the principles, objectives and 
priorities of the policy as well as its management and delivery mechanisms. 
In some respects, the consultations on both the budget and Cohesion policy have something 
of an abstract character. Member State responses to the consultation exercises, at least, 
are frequently quite general. They tend to focus on broad policy objectives rather than 
developing specific ideas, or rehearse policy views from the 2005 debate, suggesting a 
certain wariness about stating or implying national positions at this early stage. This 
reflects the fact that the original purpose of the budget review  a mid-term re-assessment 
of spending in 2007-2013 - appears to have been quietly dropped, and the focus is shifting 
to the 2014+ period, the start of which is still five years ahead. A further factor is that the 
current Commissions mandate expires in 20091, constraining its ability to take the political 
initiative on major issues such as budget reform. 
Nevertheless, the launch of a debate at some distance from the start of negotiations is 
allowing new ideas to be explored. In particular, it is providing an opportunity for existing 
policies to be re-assessed and new policy objectives to be considered.  
In this context, the following paper reviews the evolution of the debate, with respect to 
the two consultations on the budget and specifically on Cohesion policy. The paper is the 
latest in a series of EoRPA reports which have provided an annual review of developments 
in Cohesion policy, and builds on assessments of the 2005-06 negotiations and policy reform 
and the subsequent outcomes.2
                                                 
1 Although the possibility of an extension of the Commissions mandate is currently being explored in 
the light of the problems of ratifying the Reform Treaty following the Irish no vote. 
2 See for example: Bachtler J and Mendez C (2007) Renewing Cohesion Pol icy: Recent  Progress and 
Long-Term Chal lenges, EoRPA Paper 07/03, European Regional Policy Research Consortium, EPRC, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2007) New Budget , New 
Regulat ions, New St rat egies: The Reform of  EU Cohesion Pol icy, EoRPA Paper 07/03, European 
Regional Policy Research Consortium, EPRC, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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The paper begins by discussing the academic and policy research on the reform of the 
budget and then reviews the Member State contributions to the budget consultation. The 
paper then examines the review of Cohesion policy, beginning with an update on the 
implications of changes in regional data for eligibility and then examining the positions of 
Member States on the future of the policy. The paper concludes with some questions for 
discussion. 
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2. THE BUDGET REVIEW 
The Inter-Institutional Agreement of April 2006 required the Commission to undertake “ a 
ful l ,  wide-ranging review covering al l  aspect s of  EU spending, including t he CAP, and of  
resources, including t he UK rebate, t o report  in 2008/ 09…accompanied by an assessment  of  
t he appl icat ion of  t he current  IIA” .3 This review was launched by the Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso on 12 September 2007 with a consultation paper,4 introduced with the 
statement: “ This budget  review is unique, a once in a generat ion opport unit y t o make a 
reform of  t he budget  and in t he way we work” . The paper reviewed the evolution of the 
budget, the issues and principles for EU spending and the system for generating own 
resources. It also posed several questions for the consultation (see Box 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 1: Budget review – consultation questions 
x Has the EU budget proved sufficiently responsive to changing needs? 
x How should the right balance be found between the need for stability and the need 
for flexibility within multi-annual financial frameworks? 
 
x Do the new policy challenges set out here effectively summarise the key issues facing 
Europe in the coming decades? 
x What criteria should be used to ensure that the principle of European added value is 
applied effectively? 
x How should policy objectives be properly reflected in spending priorities? What 
changes are needed? 
x Over what time horizon should reorientations be made? 
How could the effectiveness and efficiency of budget delivery be improved? 
Could the transparency and accountability of the budget be further enhanced? 
x Could enhanced flexibility help to maximise the return on EU spending and political 
responsiveness of the EU budget? 
 
x What principles should underpin the revenue side of the budget and how should these 
be translated in the own resources system? 
x Is there any justification for maintaining correction or compensatory mechanisms? 
x What should be the relationship between citizens, policy priorities, and the financing 
of the EU budget? 
 
The launch of the consultation paper was used to stress several important points. First, it 
was described as a unique opportunity, separate from the Financial Framework 
negotiations on the post- 2013 period, and covering all policies (including agriculture) as 
well as the revenue side of the budget, including abatements/corrections. Second, the 
consultation was presented as being completely open; the terms no taboos, frank 
debate, fresh-thinking and no pre-conditions were frequently used. Third, the paper 
                                                 
3 Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
budgetary discipline and sound financial management, Of f icial  Journal  of  t he European Union, C139, 
14.6.2006. 
4 European Commission (2007) Reforming t he Budget , Changing Europe: A Publ ic Consult at ion Paper 
in View of  t he 2008/ 2009 Budget  Review, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, SEC(2007) 
1188, 12.9.2007 
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outlined several key principles for future policies, including subsidiarity, proportionality, 
efficiency and added value. 
Originally due to run until the spring of 2008, the public consultation was extended until 
June 2008 and attracted several hundred responses from Member States, sub-national 
authorities, European institutions, the private sector, NGOs and interest groups, academia 
and individual citizens. The consultation results are due to be presented at a conference 
hosted by Commission President Barroso in Brussels on 12 November 2008 about the 
European Union's future budgetary priorities. 
The following sections provide a broad review of the main themes to emerge from the 
consultation, drawing first on research papers and similar contributions and then examining 
the responses from Member States. 
2.1 A new budgetary debate 
The budget review has prompted extensive academic and policy debate on the future 
political and policy direction of the EU. Four themes emerge: the need for change; the 
nature of change; the management of change; and likely scenarios for change. 
One of the universal conclusions to be drawn from the consultation is the need for change. 
There is general recognition that the structure of the budget does not reflect the EUs 
political objectives and policy priorities. Many commentators highlight the need for 
ambitious goals and comprehensive reform, with a reform which is both broad in scope and 
looks to the future. In practical terms, this means aligning the EU budget with evolving 
policy challenges such as the increase in global competition, climate change, migratory 
pressures and an ageing population5. Indeed, some have argued that the EU should be 
looking beyond the current policy framework to consider more radical options, such as the 
giving the EU budget a stabilisation function  contributing to EU convergence by explicitly 
managing flows of revenue and expenditure to take account of the business cycle, and 
incorporating an explicit pillar to stabilise the cycle.6
This leads on to the nat ure of  change, where much of the debate has focused on how the 
expenditure side of the budget should be allocated, especially the balance between EU 
spending for distribution versus public goods. In broad terms, the consultation indicates a 
need for increased spending on the environment, energy and competitiveness, research and 
knowledge (see Box 2)  as well as greater cross-policy coherence in meeting EU goals in 
                                                 
5 Larch M (Ed.) (2008) Publ ic Finances in t he EU, Report  on t he Conference organised by t he Bureau 
of  European Pol icy Advisers of  t he European Commission on 3-4 Apri l  2008 in Brussels, BEPA, 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels. 
6 Dullien S and Schwarzer D (2007) Int egrat ing t he macro-dimension int o t he EU budget : reasons, 
inst rument s and democrat ic legit imacy, EU-Consent EU-Budget Working Paper No.4, August 2007 
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these areas  and a reduction or reorientation of CAP spending towards rural development 
and other contemporary policy objectives.7
Box 2: Initial results of the consultation – how the money should be spent? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?  Environment – vitally needs modern developments (increase direct  spending; 
al ign ot her pol icies wit h environmental  needs).  
?   Energy – deserves greater EU attention (increase direct  spending; concent rat e 
research ef fort s on energy; promote low-energy l i fest yle). 
?   Competitiveness, research, knowledge  requires wider support (increase 
expendit ure (up t o 25%); focus act ions wit hin ot her pol icies on improving 
compet it iveness); 
?   Agriculture – amounts and efficiency of spending do not address the new reality 
(maint ain CAP as EU pol icy reinforcing Pil lar 2; separat e CAP f rom t he budget ; 
int roduce co-f inancing; re-orient  CAP towards new goals). 
Source: Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe (op. cit .) 
Several contributions8 explicitly recall the 2005 Sapir report, which criticised the EU budget 
as being a relic of the past with too much focus on the CAP, too little focus within 
Cohesion policy and insufficient attention to EU public goods. The CAP is often singled out 
for particular criticism, on the basis of a mismatch between aims, principles and spending 
and perceived large-scale inefficiency. Cohesion policy receives less criticism on principle, 
but is also seem as suffering from problems of inefficiency, inadequate targeting 
insufficient impact.  
On the other hand, there are clearly concerns about how changes to such policies would 
affect the direction of European integration:9
“ t here exist s a great  r isk t hat  a weak European budget  would lead t o t he 
renat ional izat ion of  common pol icies so painst akingly const ruct ed over 
t ime….[and]….would not  of fer t he necessary means t o st rengt hen pol icies wit h 
real  ‘ added value’  t o European act ion. The dynamics of  European const ruct ion 
would t hen be shat t ered” . 
                                                 
7 Reforming t he Budget , Changing Europe, Presentation by Dalia Grybauskaitǣ, Commissioner for 
Financial Programming and the Budget to Members of the House of Lords, House of Commons and 
European Parliament, London, 3 July 2008. 
8 AIV (2008) The Finances of  t he European Union, Advisory Council on International Affairs, No.58, The 
Hague, December 2007. Richter S (2008) On t he Net  Financial  Posit ion of  Member St at es vis-à-vis t he 
EU Budget  and a Proposal  for Reform EU-Consent EU-Budget Working Paper, No. 7, August 2008. WIIW 
2008, Ferrer 2008, 7) 
9 Lefebrve M (2005) What  kind of  European budget  for 2013? Means and pol icies of  an enlarged Union, 
Centre des Etudes Européennes de Strasbourg, Paris. 
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Further, while it may be almost a fait accompli that the total CAP budget will be cut in 
real terms in 2013 as Europes agriculture sector continues on its trajectory of greater 
market orientation,10 it is argued that there has been insufficient consideration of the 
implications of cutting back on the CAP. In particular, there are perceived negative 
externalities associated with the withdrawal of public support for agriculture, such as 
landscape and ecological change and loss of habitats, and socio-cultural implications arising 
from consolidation of farms. New forms of intervention at national level may also increase.  
With respect to Cohesion policy, some EU12 commentators have stressed the importance of 
the EU demonstrating the same kind of solidarity with the new Member States as was shown 
to the poorer countries of the EU15.11 However, the fundamental issue for most is not the 
existence of the policy per se  there is considerable agreement on the importance of 
convergence as an EU objective - but its coverage/focus and the way that it is 
implemented. On the issue of coverage, different proposals are put forward  for example, 
concentrating convergence support on relatively poor Member States12. With respect to 
implementation, the issues are commonly those of administrative complexity and 
bureaucracy such as the multiplicity of objectives, different levels of regulation, too many 
priorities and targets of support, changing guidelines, difficulties with financial 
management and audit. They also reflect insufficient investment in administrative capacity 
in terms of skills, knowledge, guidance, organisational procedures and systems, and 
inadequate coordination across policy areas and institutions, both vertically and 
horizontally, to achieve the objectives set.13
In charting the way forward, DG Budget has defined two key questions for assessing EU 
policy intervention:  
a) re-applying the principle of European value added/subsidiarity in discussing anew 
the level at which the objectives of the proposed action can best be achieved (EU, 
national, regional, local); and 
b) choosing the appropriate tool on the basis of the principle of proportionality: 
coordination; legislation; public spending  national and/or EU. 
These principles are also underlined by other respondents, especially the need to take 
account of policy effectiveness in determining the reallocation of spending, as well as not 
restricting the choice of policy mode to funding and considering the role of regulation or 
coordination as potential policy levers.14  There are also many reminders of the small size 
                                                 
10 IEEP (2007) Towards t he CAP Healt h Check and t he European Budget  Review: The proposals, 
opt ions for region and issues arising, Institute for European Environmental policy, September 2007. 
11 Inotai A (2007) Reflections on the future of the EU budget with special reference to the position of 
the net beneficiary countries, Romanian Journal  of  European Af fairs, Vol. 7, No. 3, October 2007. 
12 AIV (2007) op. cit . 
13 AER (2007) AER St udy on Regional  Pol icy 2014+, Assembly of European Regions, www.aer.eu 
14 Begg I (2007) The 2008/ 9 EU Budget  Review, EU-Consent EU-Budget Working Paper No.3, March 
2007. SIEPS (2007) Agenda 2014: A Zero-Base Approach, European Policy Analysis, Swedish Institute 
for European Policy Studies, Stockholm. 
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of the EU budget (c. one percent of EU GDP), the need to adapt EU intervention to the 
resources available, and the primary role of national spending in most policy areas 
Turning to the revenue side of the budget, the budget debate has also promoted extensive 
discussion of the own resources of the EU. On one side of the argument, there is 
considerable support for some kind of EU tax. One review considers the merits of a 
European VAT, excise duty, eco-duty, corporate income tax, personal income tax on the 
basis of several criteria (transparency, simplicity, dynamism, economic efficiency, equity), 
concluding that an eco-tax or corporate income tax would meet the criteria best.15 The 
merits of a telecoms tax16, financial transactions tax17 or foreign exchange tax18 have also 
been highlighted. However, even those who support the principle of a tax-based own 
resource, warn that the political arguments over and EU tax could divert or derail the 
whole budget debate.19  
Others are strongly opposed to en EU tax on theoretical, empirical and political grounds.20 
Indeed, one study concludes that “ our f indings st rongly rej ect  t he idea t hat  a reform based 
on an EU tax-based own resource would remedy current  problems…the dist ribut ive 
consequences would be immense and would t herefore, in a count erproduct ive way creat e 
new necessit ies for compensat ion” .21 In fact, they see the link between the EU budget and 
national budgets as an incentive to control EU-level spending; instead, they propose 
phasing out VAT and basing the budget financing entirely on GNI. A strong emphasis on GNI 
and elimination of VAT as a basis for contributions are widely supported.22
A further issue relates to correction mechanisms. While there is a widespread view that 
correction mechanisms should be avoided, it is also recognised that some method for 
dealing with Member State concerns on net balances is required. One proposal is for a 
separation of budget and policy debates, first agreeing a budget that Member States are 
willing to finance and then moving on to how that budget should be spent.23 An alternative 
                                                 
15 Le Cacheux J (2007) Funding t he EU Budget  wit h a Genuine Own Resource: The Case for a European 
Tax, Notre Europe, March 2007. 
16 Begg (2007) op. cit . 
17 Schulmeister S, Schratzenstaller-Altzinger M and Picek O (1008) A General  Financial  Transact ions 
Tax: mot ives, revenues, Feasibi l i t y and Ef fect s, WIFO, Österreichisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung, Vienna. 
18 Richter S (2008) Searching new ways for f inancing t he EU budget  – on t he prioposal  of  a European 
t ax on foreign exchange, Paper to Ökosoziales Forum Europa, 21 January 2008, Vienna Institute for 
Economic Studies. 
19 Sapir (2007) Priorit ies for EU budget  reform, Paper to SIEPS 2007 Annual Conference The Purse of 
the EU: Setting Priorities for the Future, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm 
2007, 
20 Caesar R (2006) Die Finanzwirtschaft der EU - Historisches Relikt oder solide Zukunftsbasis, 
Zeit schrif t  für Pol it ik 3/2006, 333-352. Heinemann F, Mohl P and Osterloh (2008) Reform Opt ions for 
t he EU Own Resources Syst em, Summary of Research project 8/06, Zentrum für Europäische 
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH, Mannheim, 18 January 2008. 
21 Heinemann et  al  (2008) op. cit . 
22 Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe (op. cit .) 
23 Begg (2007) op. cit . 
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approach would be to develop a generalised correction mechanism so that net balances do 
not exceed a particular figure and reimburse the excess to Member States.24 A detailed 
proposal for resolving the net balance issue is shown in Box 3.25
Box 3: Principles for addressing the net balance issue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The guiding principles of the proposed new EU budgetary system are fair sharing of burdens across 
member states, citizens and firms; clear and simple rules for the collection of revenues and 
allocation of expenditures, without exemptions; and finally maximum possible flexibility in the 
utilization of resources from the EU budget. 
The proposed new rules for cross member state redistribution are: 
x Member state contributions are determined by the member state GNI, being different 
through differences in relative member state prosperity. 
x Member state receipts are determined by the per capita average EU GNI, the same value 
for each member state. 
x Differences in net financial positions of individual member states are determined solely by 
differences in relative prosperity, clearly measurable through the GNI indicator. 
x Solidarity of member states would be expressed, contrary to the current situation, on the 
revenue side of the EU budget and not on the expenditure side. 
Reform proposals for the revenues of the EU budget: 
x The contribution from each member state is fixed as a unified rate (1%) of the member 
state GNI 
x The contributions in each member state are collected via a splitting up of a pre-fixed 
share of collected VAT and corporate income tax revenues. Should revenues from both 
taxes surpass the pre-set sum of the member states contribution, the surplus will be re-
channelled to the member state treasury. 
Reform proposals for the expenditures of the EU budget: 
x Each citizen of the EU receives a certain share (1%) of the average per capita EU GNI 
each year. Receipts from the EU budget at member state level would amount to 1% of the 
average per capita EU GNI multiplied by the number of inhabitants in the member state 
concerned. 
x Receipts from the EU budget can be utilized to finance eligible programmes along various 
EU policies, but not for any other purposes. 
x Each member state enjoys maximum possible flexibility in the allocation of its resources 
from the EU budget across eligible targets. 
Source: Richter (2008) op. cit .  
Apart from stressing the need for change, and proposing specific features of changes to be 
made, the budget review has prompted contributions on how t o manage change to the 
budget and EU policies.  
Several respondents suggest some institutional starting points for facilitating the 
development of more relevant policy objectives and financial planning:  the alignment of 
the Commissions mandate and the electoral cycle of the European Parliament; an 
institutionalisation of the mid-tem review to provide opportunities for adjustment to 
                                                 
24 Lefebrve (2005) op. cit . The threshold proposed is 0.5 percent, considerably above the average for 
the major net payers over the past decade. 
25 Richter (2008) op. cit . 
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changing priorities; and avoidance of red lines and pre-negotiated agreements.26 In terms 
of managing the process of policy change, one proposal is for a zero-base approach, 
starting from a clean slate, defining longer term objectives (potentially over several 
financial periods) and planning a transition process.27 As a political strategy, it stresses the 
need for analytical underpinnings  defining substantive priorities, analysing impact data, 
understanding national perspectives and developing strategies for policy termination. A 
similar approach taken by the Slovenia Taskforce involves analysis of the challenges, 
assessing the contributions of economic theory and accommodating political reality.28   
Many contributors place emphasis on better independent assessment and understanding of 
the efficiency and effectiveness of policies (notably impact  what works, what doesnt) as 
part of a more structured and systematic approach to making expenditure decisions.29  A 
useful illustration of this kind of analytical approach is shown in Table 1, with six criteria  
based on public economics and fiscal federalism - for assessing whether EU funding should 
be provided for a policy area, supplemented by political criteria and legal principles.30  
Table 1: Criteria for determining EU intervention 
Criteria for EU funding 
 
Does it involve market failure or equity goal? 
 
Is funding better than regulation or other instruments? 
 Pu
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Is intervention cost-effective? 
 
Does it achieve economies of scale? 
 
Is there internalisation of externalities? 
 Fi
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Is there significant heterogeneity of preferences? 
 
Does it meet EU objectives? 
Po
lit
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ri
a 
Does intervention have public acceptance? 
Does it respect the principle of subsidiarity? 
Le
ga
l 
pr
in
ci
pl
e
s 
Does it respect the principle of proportionality? 
Source: adapted from Figueira (2005) op. cit .; (2008) op. cit . 
                                                 
26 Begg (2007) op. cit . Hagemann & Zulef (2008) 
27 Tarschys (2007) op. cit . 
28 Mrak M, DrobniĆ M, Erjavec E, Mavko M, Rant V, Ravnik B, uteriĆ J, Vajgl U and Wostner P (2007) 
EU budget  review: An opport unit y for a t horough reform or minor adj ust ment s, Final Report of the 
EU Budget Reform taskforce, Ljubljana. 
29 Begg (2007) op. cit .  Hagemann & Zulef (2008) op. cit . 
30 Figueira F (2005) How t o reform t he EU budget ? Going beyond f iscal  federal ism, Utrecht University 
Figueira F (2008) A bet t er budget  for Europe: economical ly ef f icient , pol it ical ly real ist ic,  European 
Policy Analysis, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm.  
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On the basis of Table 1, high effectiveness of EU intervention is accorded to: research, 
education and transport policies (in meeting the EU objective of growth); Cohesion policy 
(convergence objective); and home affairs policy (internal security objective. Policies with 
medium effectiveness are recorded as: environment; restructuring and employment 
policies (sustainable growth objective); and defence, development and foreign policies 
(external security objective). Rural development (sustainable growth objective) is the only 
policy area rated as having low effectiveness.31
The final issue considered by academic commentators are scenarios for change, focusing on 
how things might develop in practice. Although many commentators have stressed the 
importance of going beyond the status quo,32 it has been noted that radical change is 
unlikely for several reasons33: first, the political salience of net balances is not going to 
disappear; second, the EU budget as a whole is unlikely to grow and may in fact be 
reduced; third, EU taxes are not acceptable to many governments (see also the following 
section); and fourth, Member States are unlikely to give up control over the budget. In this 
context, a more likely scenario is gradual change to the budget with a progressive reduction 
in spending on the CAP (but shifting funding to rural development or environmental action), 
improving the efficiency of Cohesion policy spending and building up spending on 
alternative areas. There may also be scope to simplify the system of own resources, 
focusing more (or exclusively) on GNI, and eliminating VAT. 
One of the best-developed scenario plans has been undertaken by the Slovenian Taskforce, 
which articulates four scenarios: two variants of the status quo based on existing  
expenditure and existing policies; and two scenarios involving substantive change, a 
restrictive scenario with a minimalist EU budget, and a community scenario which 
strengthens the role of the EU budget and common European policies. For each, the 
Taskforce considers different enlargement possibilities (to include Croatia, Western Balkans 
and Turkey), producing a set of possible expenditure commitments ranging from 0.71 to 
1.32 percent of EU GNI.  
A similar exercise conducted by Maxime Lefebrve presents three projections  a 
conservative scenario (based on retention of the current policy mix, and a budget limited to 
one percent of EU GNI), a competitiveness-solidarity scenario (involving a redeployment of 
resources to research, TENS, education etc but with the same budget ceiling); and a 
European public goods scenario, which goes beyond the one percent budget ceiling to 
include defence spending).  
Such scenarios provide some insight into the possible financial parameters for the proposals 
made in the budget review. However, it is worth restating the view that the most 
important service that the review can provide would be to engineer an irrevocable change 
                                                 
31 Figueira (2005) op. cit  
32 Larch (2008) op. cit . 
33 Zuleeg F (2007) Reform of  t he EU budget  – an opport unit y for a radical ly dif ferent  EU? Paper to 
Seminar EU Budget Review: Benefit for Europe and Lithuania, Vilnius, 12 October 2007. 
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in the terms of the debate about the budget, making the political and intellectual case for 
a new approach to budget and policy planning.34
2.2 Member State perspectives 
Having discussed the general responses to the budget consultation, the following section 
reviews the responses of Member States.  All of the Member States, apart from Slovenia, 
made some form of response if only partly dealing with all of the questions posed by the 
Commission. In general, there is a general welcome for having a debate on the budget 
separate from the financial negotiations; many countries support a discussion of discuss 
revenue and expenditure in parallel and for all policies to be considered together. At the 
same time, several submissions explicitly recognise the difficulties involved in changing a 
complex system involving so many stakeholders, implying that the scope for change may be 
limited. Responses to the consultation are often cautious, often framed as initial ideas; 
several Member States noted that internal consultations were planned or ongoing. 
2.2.1 General principles 
In reviewing the overall approach of the submissions, several observations can be made on 
the general principles put forward by Member States. These relate to the size of the EU 
budget, the principles for future policy decisions, principles of financial management, the 
need for flexibility, and the long term nature of possible change. 
First, the fundamental differences between Member States on the size of the EU budget , 
which were so evident in the 2005 negotiations, continue unsurprisingly to feature in the 
budget consultation. On the one hand, Sweden argues for a leaner, yet sharper budget 
with substantial reprioritisation of expenditure. The United Kingdom takes a similar view on 
the need for a reorientation of the budget. The Netherlands considers that total spending 
must remain constant as a percentage of GNI; Austria also advocates a long-term trend of 
keeping spending at about one percent of GNI. On the other hand, Greece, Poland and 
Portugal emphasise the need for the EU budget to have sufficient resources, warning (in the 
case of the Polish submission) that budget reductions will reduce responsiveness to 
changing needs. Romania considers that the current budget ceiling may be acceptable in 
the short to medium term but would have to be increased to fund future developments in 
European integration such as further enlargement. 
Second, Member States identify a range of principles on which future policy priorities 
should be based  added value, solidarity, proport ionality, subsidiarity.   
x With regard to resource allocation, added value is seen universally as a basic 
principle governing expenditure decisions but with different interpretations (see 
2.2.2 below).  
x Solidarity is cited as a key principle by almost all the EU12 together with Greece, 
Portugal and Spain, explicitly or implicitly referring to the need to maintain 
                                                 
34 Begg (2008) op. cit . 
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expenditure on Structural and Cohesion Funds. As the Greek submission notes (p.7): 
“ Cohesion pol icy…const it ut es a fundament al  expression of  sol idarit y” . Solidarity is 
also mentioned in the submissions from the Netherlands and the UK but is 
interpreted as focusing resources on the poorest Member States.  
x Proportionality is listed by some Member States but often without definition. 
Where it is explained, it means ensuring that the most appropriate instruments are 
used (France, United Kingdom) or that the content and form of actions are not 
excessive (Sweden)  see also 2.2.1 below.   
x Subsidiarity is similarly mentioned in several submissions but without being clearly 
defined; under this principle, Denmark argues that Member States should assume 
more responsibility for the funds which they manage, a point which is echoed by 
some other countries with respect to management and control systems (e.g. 
Slovakia). 
Third, a similar set of principles are put forward for management of the budget as a whole  
equity, transparency, efficiency/effectiveness and simplicity.  
x The most common concern for almost all countries is that the impact of the budget 
on individual Member States is seen to be fair and equitable in terms of the 
relationship between contributions and receipts. The principle of equity is used to 
justify arguments on both the revenue and expenditure side of the budget; perhaps 
paradoxically, the use of balancing mechanisms is generally rejected  see 2.2.4 
below.  
x The principle of transparency is used either to advocate greater openness in the 
resource allocation methodology (Austria, Germany) or to improve accountability to 
auditors and citizens on the use of funding (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia).  
x Efficiency/effectiveness are mentioned by some Member States in connection 
with improved management of EU funding, particularly the reduction of 
administrative expenditure by European institutions (Austria, Denmark) or more 
performance-based governance (France, United Kingdom), and the need for 
improvement in audit and control systems to meet the concerns of the European 
Court of Auditors (Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden). The importance of more/better 
monitoring and evaluation is also highlighted under this heading (Austria, France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland). 
x Lastly, greater simplicity is highlighted by a few Member States, referring either 
to the need for more coherence in EU policymaking (Austria, United Kingdom) or 
the need to simplify administration; indeed the Austrian submission noted that 
(p.2): “ i f  no progress is made in furt her simpl if ying programme administ rat ion, 
Aust ria would be led t o reconsider i t s present  posit ive at t it ude t owards t he 
principle of  shared management ”  
Fourth, the submissions from Member States suggest they see lit t le need for more 
flexibility in the EU budget. Most of the countries responding on this issue believe that the 
EoRPA Paper 08/4  European Policies Research Centre 12
Ideas for Budget and Policy Reform: Reviewing the Future of Cohesion Policy 2014+ 
multi-annual frameworks provide important stability and predictability (e.g. Germany, 
Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden). Romania is one of the exceptions, considering 
that expenditure ceilings limit flexibility in addressing medium/long-term objectives. The 
general view is that more flexibility would be desirable wit hin the expenditure ceilings for 
individual policies, as well as potentially providing a greater margin to deal with unforeseen 
developments or crises (Estonia, Sweden). 
Finally, Member States are universally keen to avoid making significant changes to the 
2007-13 financial framework but to focus the budget review on the post-2014 period. 
Some countries also stress that the resource allocation decisions should be completely 
open, avoiding the type of pre-emptive decisions made on the CAP in 2002. The German 
submission notes that (p.6): “ before t he end of  t his process, no a priori commit ment s can 
made for individual  spheres which would have an impact  on future f inancial  f rameworks” .  
2.2.2 Added value 
Added value was the subject of a specific question in the Commission consultation paper, 
where Member States were asked what criteria should be used to ensure that the principle 
of European added value is applied effectively. 
One of the striking conclusions from the consultation is the universal support among 
Member States for decisions on future EU policies to be based on their European added 
value. Whatever the national views on the size, shape or content of the budget, every 
submission agreed that policies needed to demonstrate, or be justified by, their added 
value. 
This commitment to added value can immediately be qualified by the different 
interpretations (or the lack of interpretation) of what added value means in practice. Most 
commonly, EU policies are perceived as having added value if they generate greater benefit 
to the EU citizens if carried out at EU level in comparison to national or local levels (e.g. 
submissions from the Czech Republic, Denmark, Netherlands, Slovakia, United Kingdom) or 
in comparison to private initiatives (Netherlands). However, as the lists of criteria proposed 
by Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Spain (see Table 2) indicate, there are many 
other definitions of added value. These broadly divide into two groups:  
x specific criteria which would involve attempting to quantify or otherwise measure 
the effectiveness, efficiency or efficacy of particular policies, such as through 
evaluation, cost-benefit analysis or impact analysis; 
x broad criteria based largely on political judgements on the contribution of policies 
to European objectives/interests, international cooperation, European values/ideas 
or the process of European integration. 
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Table 2: Criteria proposed by Member States for assessing the added value of EU 
policies  
Proposed added value criteria 
 
CY DE ES HU PL 
Cost-effectiveness  lower cost through using EU instruments; justified by CBA 
  *   * 
Financial synergy  critical financial mass only achievable at EU level 
  *  * * 
Efficiency/economies of scale  
 * *  *  
Policy additionality  better outcomes through EU action than national measures 
  *    
Nature of the problem  requirement for, or contribution to, European cooperation 
 * *    
Positive externalities for EU integration e.g. security, single market, justice area 
 * * * *  
Collective/shared Member State interests  facilitates/maximises collective action 
 * * *  * 
Multiplier effects  through synergies, enhances effort by Member State resources 
   *   
Adaptive capacity  facilitating MS adjustment to Community decisions 
     * 
Contribution to EU objectives  e.g. cohesion, competitiveness 
 *   *  
Provision of EU public goods  e.g. safety, border control, environmental standards 
 *   *  
Coherence  contribution to inter-policy coherence and coordination 
 *   *  
Promotion of European idea  making membership benefits visible to the citizen 
 *     
 
As the German and Spanish submissions recognise, added value is a difficult concept to 
specify and measure. However, there appears to be a widespread desire to have a 
structured process in place which combines whatever quantitative measures are available 
with qualitative assessments in order to improve decisions on resource allocation and the 
wider management of the EU budget: 
“ a qual it at ive slant  on European valued added can indicate whet her a pol icy 
f inanced by t he Communit y budget  is l ikely t o have a great er impact  t han nat ional  
f inancing…[but ]. . . t he concept  cannot  provide a rel iable, precise and viable answer 
t o t he quest ion as t o whet her a pol icy should be f inanced f rom t he Communit y 
budget….[t herefore]…we should make greater use inst ead of  t he most  precise 
possible object ives, impact  assessment , cost -benef it s analyses and evaluat ions”  
(German submission, p.6).   
“ t he Communit y budget  must  st imulat e t hrough it s planning and evaluat ion of  
expendit ure, a business organizat ion and management  focused cul t ure, aimed at  
promot ing compet it iveness and ef f iciency at  al l  levels of  t he Union”  (Spanish 
submission, p.3) 
The different emphases placed on the various criteria reflect the political approaches of 
Member States to the budget. For those countries seeking to restrict the size of the EU 
budget, the added value criterion is seen as a way of ensuring value-for-money, for 
example: “ in t hose cases where expendit ure at  t he EU level  is deemed t o be appropriat e, 
our cit izens right ly expect  i t  t o be used ef f icient ly sand t hat  i t  generat es palpable 
resul t s…and provides a real  European added value”  (Swedish submission, p.3).  
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By contrast, submissions from other Member States suggest wariness about how an added 
value test might be used. The Greek submission argues that the added value of Community 
funding should not be questioned where associated with the implementation of 
Community policies. The Portuguese contribution warns that assessments of added value 
should not: 
“ lose focus by giving more weight  t o cost s t hen benef it s: al l  gains, whet her direct  
or indirect  should be t aken int o account …..cert ain benef it s cannot  immediately be 
quant if ied and, since t he European project  is based on values, promot ing t hose 
values has clear added value in it sel f .”  (Portuguese submission, p.2) 
2.2.3 Policy priorit ies 
Moving on from general principles, one of the main objectives of the budget consultation is 
to consider new challenges and spending priorities. Here, there appears to be considerable 
consensus in three main areas.  
x First, every Member State supports more emphasis on research and innovation; in 
some cases, the knowledge economy is regarded as the top priority. This is 
frequently framed in the context of a broader approach to competitiveness or the 
Lisbon strategy with support also for entrepreneurship and SMEs, education and 
training, and (in some cases) social protection. The further development of Trans-
European Networks is seen as important by some countries, although others 
question the cost-effectiveness of some investment in this area. 
x A second area of agreement is the importance accorded to EU-level action on 
environment and energy issues, through efforts to mitigate climate change and 
enhance energy security, more incentives for renewable energy and energy 
efficiency and more attention to environmental protection. 
x Third, Member States largely agree on the importance of the EUs external and 
internal policies in promoting political stability in neighbouring countries, 
international development and addressing terrorism, transnational crime, and 
migration (with specific reference by some countries to sharing the burden of 
external border controls). The importance of better crisis management is advocated 
by some Member States, with particular geographical priorities being the Western 
Balkans, Middle East and Mediterranean. 
Apart from these general areas of support, there are some specific policy priorities, such as 
consumer policy (Germany), space research (France) and maritime issues (Portugal). The 
problem of demographic ageing is mentioned by Austria, Finland, France and Romania. 
The difficulty for the EU is how to respond to these major and complex policy priorities. 
Several Member States are concerned about the implications for the EU budget and 
prefaced their submissions on policy issues by stressing that not every challenge of change 
requires additional Community spending and that any funding needs to be targeted (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom). Recalling the 
above discussion of added value, the Czech Republic notes that EU intervention is only 
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required where national action and resources are insufficient. The Dutch, French and 
United Kingdom submissions stress that consideration should be given to non-financial 
instruments (e.g. regulation, coordination of national policies, exchange of good practice), 
the scope for using alternative financing options (such as EIB lending) and the need for 
selectivity  giving priority to areas where EU leverage can be maximised.   
The submissions from other Member States suggest a concern with the impact of reshaping 
the budget on national receipts. Both Ireland and Poland argue that changes to 
budget/policy priorities should be gradual, with new initiatives being phased in over time. 
Bulgaria and Romania are two of the countries stressing the role of Cohesion policy in 
meeting the competitiveness objectives of the EU as well as contributing to the EU policy 
responses on climate change. 
The obstacles to reorienting the budget are evident in the Member State views on the 
future of the CAP.   
(i) Agricul t ural  pol icy 
One of the major fault lines in the budgetary debate is agriculture; indeed, Denmark states 
that the CAP is at the centre of the budget review. For one group of Member States, the 
CAP needs major reform. The United Kingdom, for example, is clear: spending on Pillar 1 of 
the CAP should be phased out. Denmark, Estonia, Malta and the Netherlands share this 
view, in the Dutch case arguing for a break in historical patterns of expenditure allocation 
and fast transition, while the Danish submission foresees scope for phasing out direct 
agricultural subsidies by 2025. All four Member States consider that rural development 
funding under CAP Pillar II should focus on public goods such as the environment, ecology, 
food safety and animal welfare, with (in the Danish view) support for poorer areas being 
transferred to Cohesion policy. 
However, the phasing out of the CAP appears to be minority view. For most Member States, 
adjustment rather than radical reform is necessary, with an emphasis on maintaining a 
competitive agricultural sector. For example, France sees a need for the CAP to: ensure the 
food security of European consumers, based on a steady, accessible, healthy and safe food 
supply; contribute to global food balance; help the fight against climate change and for 
environmental improvement; and preserve territorial balance. Similarly, Portugal argues 
that the food supply objective of the CAP regains strategic relevance in the current phase 
of rising food prices. Other countries, such as Austria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania 
supports the continuation of Pillar 1 but place more emphasis on its role in securing 
compliance with standards in environmental protection, reducing emissions, biodiversity, 
food safety and animal protection. CAP reforms to ensure a greater market orientation of 
the agricultural sector are stressed by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy and 
Slovakia; the Czech Republic sees the need for a wider liberalisation of protectionist 
measures to open up agricultural trade. For EU12 countries, such as Latvia and Romania, a 
key issue is to ensure that future CAP support is based on equal eligibility conditions and 
support levels across all Member States. 
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There is more common ground among Member States on the importance of strengthening 
rural development support under Pillar 2. However, while many countries advocate 
transferring resources from Pillar I, others (e.g. Greece) consider that additional Pillar 2 
resources should be provided from elsewhere in the EU budget. 
In defending the CAP, many of the submissions note that agricultural support has already 
undergone extensive reforms and reductions as a proportion of the EU budget. Spain makes 
an explicit political statement that: “ any discussion about  reforming t he CAP beyond a 
‘ medical  check up’  must  be l inked t o t he Brit ish rebat e and compensat ions review” .  
There is also considerable resistance to the question of reducing CAP expenditure but 
introducing national co-financing. While Italy considers that co-financing should be 
mandatory to avoid distortions between Member States and (even on a limited basis) would 
release funding for other priorities, this is rejected by a range of countries (Estonia, Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania). The main concern is that national 
co-financing would lead to competition in subsidies among Member States, placing 
disproportionate pressure on the budgets of poorer countries, and distortion of the internal 
market in agricultural products. 
(i i) Cohesion pol icy 
There are similar divisions among Member States on the future of Cohesion policy. The most 
radical position is taken by the UK: that Cohesion policy should be limited to the poorer 
Member States and phased out in richer countries. Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Sweden also favour Structural and Cohesion Funds being directed to the least prosperous 
regions in the least prosperous countries, supplemented by cross-border and/or 
transnational cooperation programmes. Several of the submissions underline the 
importance of richer countries being responsible for their own regional development 
challenges. As the Swedish submission notes, outside the areas most in need (p.4): 
“ nat ional  and regional  ef fort s should be t he basis for regional development . Col laborat ion, 
exchange of  experiences and benchmarking bet ween regions wil l  safeguard t he European 
dimension of  regional development  measures.”  These views are shared by some of the 
EU12: Estonia argues that the financing of poorer regions in richer states should be 
reconsidered, while both the Czech Republic and Romania are in favour of increasing the 
focus of the policy on the least-developed Member States. 
Other richer Member States are less radical. Germany advocates focusing resources on 
structurally weak regions but sees a continued case for other regions being given 
targeted assistance in developing their competences. Finland and France take a similar 
view, supporting measures for growth competitiveness and jobs being implemented across 
the EU. Austria is also cautious, supporting the concept of a comprehensive and integrated 
structural and regional policy but (like Finland and Germany) believes that spending should 
be focused on higher added value measures, especially in richer parts of thee EU.  Several 
of the more prosperous countries  Austria, Denmark, Sweden - are concerned to ensure 
that allocations under Cohesion policy are made on the basis of relative wealth so that 
countries with comparable levels of GDP should benefit equally from returns from the EU 
budget. 
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The maintenance of an EU-wide Cohesion policy is supported strongly by other EU15 
countries, such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. According to the Italian submission 
(p.2): “ Al l  t errit ories of  t he Union should have a chance t o exploit  t heir development  
pot ent ial…[and]…cont ribut e t o EU compet it iveness regardless of  t he average development  
levels of  t he Member St ates t o which t hey belong” . Greece is especially concerned to avoid 
discrimination between old and new Member States. 
For the newer Member States, Cohesion policy plays a still more central role in national 
thinking about the budget. Many of the EU12 preface their budget submissions by 
highlighting the wide disparities in development levels and the barriers to the achievement 
of existing European objectives (such as the internal market) as well as new policy 
priorities (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia). 
The Polish submission notes that (p.4): “ i f  new development  chal lenges are t o be 
ef fect ively met , i t  is a prerequisit e t o st rengthen t he Union’ s cohesion” . 
There is clearly some concern among the EU12 at the implications of new policy priorities 
for spending on Cohesion policies. Most of the new Member States the EU12 highlight 
solidarity as one of the main principles of EU budget spending and the need for adequate 
resources, meaning (in the Czech and Romanian view) a greater concentration of Cohesion 
policy funding on the less-developed Member States. Lithuania warns that (p.2): “ new 
chal lenges should not  overshadow the main obj ect ives of  t he Cohesion pol icy….and should 
not  change t he purpose of  t his pol icy” .  Hungary argues that, in the light of recent changes 
to the policy, major reform is not required, and the debate should concentrate on 
improving complementarity and coherence with other EU policies 
The Danish and German submission specifically reject the use of the territorial cohesion 
concept to support areas on the basis of specific geographic criteria. In the German view 
(p.8): “ t he creat ion of  new crit eria for t he select ion of  t he least  developed regions could 
wat er down cohesion pol icy and diminish t heir ef f iciency” . Cyprus, Greece, Poland, 
Portugal and Spain take a different view. The Portuguese submission argues for an 
integrated and flexible approach to territories to foster more polycentric development in 
the EU. The Spanish submission advocates that (p.7) “ part icular at t ent ion should be paid t o 
regions wit h specif ic geographic handicaps which af fect  t heir compet it iveness, as is t he 
case of  ul t ra peripheral  regions” . For Greece, the adoption of a policy for EU islands is of 
particular interest and similarly for Cyprus and Malta. 
2.2.4 Own resources 
The final set of questions in the budget consultation relate to the revenue side of the EU 
budget and specifically the operation of the own resources system and the justification for 
maintaining correction or compensatory mechanisms. 
Overall, there is little consensus on how the EU should generate revenue. On the one hand, 
there is some support for an EU tax, the allocation of part national tax shares to the EU or 
some other new financial instrument for revenue generation on the basis that it could be 
simpler, fairer and more transparent (Austria, Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg). 
However, other countries are ambivalent (Romania, Spain) and many Member States are 
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completely opposed to an EU tax (Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, 
Sweden) either on principle or because the current level of political and economic 
integration does not appear to be compatible with the adoption of taxes as a basis for own 
resources (Polish submission). Among the latter group, there is general support for 
maintaining a GNI-based system  and indeed in many cases abolishing the VAT resource to 
leave GNI as the sole source of financing, although some new Member States consider that 
this would be damaging for them. 
As noted above, a key principle for many Member States is that there should be fairness in 
their budget contributions; in some cases, this is judged on the basis of the relationship 
between national GDP and budget payments, in others in terms of net balances. The 
majority of countries are opposed to special corrections for individual Member States or a 
general correction mechanisms, but some consider that, unless fairness can be addressed 
on the expenditure side, a balancing mechanism will be necessary (France, Italy, Malta, 
Sweden). 
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3. THE REVIEW OF COHESION POLICY  
3.1 Policy context and milestones 
The debate on the future of Cohesion policy post 2013 was formally launched with the 
publication of the European Commissions Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion 
on 30 May 2007. As well as providing an account of the state of economic, social and 
territorial development in the EU27, an assessment of the impact of Cohesion policy in 
2000-2006 and some initial results of the 2007-13 programming exercise, the report took 
stock of the regional development challenges in the years ahead and posed a series of 
questions as a basis for a public consultation on the future of Cohesion policy.  
Initial reactions and views from a broad array of stakeholders were exchanged and debated 
at the Fourth Cohesion Forum held in September 2007.35 At the political level, the debate 
was taken forward by the Portuguese Presidency of the EU Council, which organised an 
informal ministerial meeting in the Azores in November 2007 on the themes of territorial 
cohesion and regional policy. The Slovenian Presidency organised a major conference with 
more widespread participation in Maribor in April 2008, following the conclusion of the 
Commissions public consultation (the results of which were reported by the Commission in 
the Fifth Progress Report on Cohesion, adopted in June 200836).  
As part of its internal preparation process, the Commission is investing considerable 
resources into the coordination of a series of internal and external studies to draw out 
lessons for the future and feed into the process of strategic reflection. Much of this work 
should be finalised by the end of 2008 or in 2009, including: the ex-post evaluation of the 
2000-2006 period; studies on Cohesion policy governance, management and implementation 
systems and the costs involved, governance methods for regional innovation strategies, and 
on the distribution of regional development competencies in EU Member States; a study on 
the dynamics and implications of the challenges facing regions with a 2020 time-frame; and 
the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion. A first set of guidelines with concrete reform 
proposals are anticipated to be published by the Commission in Spring 2009. 
The following sections review the main themes to emerge from the debate on the future of 
EU Cohesion policy. To set the budgetary context, it begins with an overview of the main 
changes to eligibility based on the latest available data, since this determines Member 
State priorities. The final two sections provide an outline of the Commissions views on the 
reform, followed by a review of Member State responses to the consultation. 
3.2 Budgetary context and eligibility 
At the heart of the reform debate on EU Cohesion policy is a complex set of budgetary 
issues concerning overall expenditure and the allocation of finance to countries and 
                                                 
35 For a review see Bachtler J and Mendez C (2007) op cit . 
36 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Fif t h progress 
report  on economic and social  cohesion Growing regions, growing Europe, COM (2008) 371, Brussels. 
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regions. At this stage in the debate, the overall amount of the budget and the share for 
Cohesion policy in that total is an unknown. It is also unclear just how much of an appetite 
there is for a fundamental reform of budgetary principles, or whether modest adjustments 
of the current mechanisms are more likely. However, it is clear that, unless steps are taken 
to disentangle decisions about revenue-raising from those about spending, the distribution 
of Cohesion policy resources will continue to be an important element in determining 
acceptable net balances. Moreover, eligibility for the Convergence priority  both the 
regional (formerly Objective 1) and the national element (ie. the Cohesion Fund) has 
become entrenched in Commission policy. It is arguable that the so-called Berlin formula 
has also achieved this status, although the final negotiations of both the 2000-6 and 2007-
13 Financial Perspectives involved substantial tinkering with the methodology to achieve 
politically acceptable outcomes. 
The distribution of funding for the 2007-13 period was principally based on GDP data for 
2000-2 and GNI data for 2001-3. Data for three subsequent years has now been published 
and this already suggests some significant shifts in eligibility for the Convergence objective. 
These are summarised in Figure 1. 
Current convergence coverage involves 84 regions in 18 Member States and a total 
population of around 154 million, this being over 31 percent of the EU27 population. On the 
basis of GDP data for 2003-5, this would fall significantly - to 67 regions in 15 Member 
States and total of 121 million inhabitants, or about 25 percent of the EU population. These 
changes arise from a combination of regional economic change and the impact of Bulgaria 
and Romania on EU average GDP  ie the shift from EU25 to EU27, which entails a further 
statistical effect. 
At the national level, the principal changes would be as follows within the old Member 
States: 
x Germany: would lose all convergence coverage 
x Greece: three regions would lose eligibility, with coverage falling from 37 to 24 
percent of the national population 
x Spain: three regions would lose eligibility; only Extremadura would retain it so that 
coverage would fall from 31 percent to 2.5 percent of the population 
x UK: West Wales & the Valleys; Cornwall & Scilly Isles would lose eligibility, so that 
the UK would have no Convergence regions. 
Importantly, however, changes are not limited to the EU15: 
x Malta would lose convergence status 
x Poland: the region of Mazowiecki would lose convergence status 
x Slovenia: following split into two NUTS 2 regions, one would lose eligibility. 
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Situation would be unchanged in the remaining countries currently concerned by 
Convergence status, namely: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia.  
Figure 1: Current eligibility and future eligibility changes 
 
2007-13 Coverage (2000-2 GDP data) 
Future eligibility? 2003-5 
GDP data 
 
Convergence Phasing-
out 
Phasing-in Convergence Phasing-out? 
EU27 Pop (m) 153798.8 16594.5 19534.2 121088.3 39837.7 
EU27 Pop (%) 31.4 3.4 4.0 24.6 8.1 
EU27 no of 
regions 84 16 13 67 25 
Belgium   12.3   19.1 
Bulgaria  100.0   100.0  
Czech rep 88.6   88.5  
Germany  12.3 6.1   13.3 
Estonia  100.0   100.0  
Ireland    26.7   
Greece  36.5 55.7 7.8 23.6 32.7 
Spain  31.0 5.8 20.6 2.5 28.4 
France  2.9   2.9  
Italy  29.0 1.0 2.8 28.8 4.4 
Cyprus    100.0   
Latvia  100.0   100.0  
Lithuania  100.0   100.0  
Hungary  71.9  28.1 71.8  
Malta  100.0    100.0 
Austria   3.4    
Poland  100.0   86.5 13.5 
Portugal  67.6 3.9 2.3 67.5 3.9 
Romania  100.0   100.0  
Slovenia  100.0   53.9  
Slovakia  88.8   88.8  
Finland    12.8   
UK  4.0 0.6 4.4  4.0 
Source: Commission information from Inforegio and own calculations from Eurostat data. 
A number of points arise from this. Convergence region coverage would become much more 
heavily concentrated in the new Member States. In these countries the only losses would be 
Mazowiecki, Malta and Zahodna Slovenija. These losses are significant, particularly in the 
case of Malta, which, for 2005-7 has GNI of less than 75 percent of the EU27 average and 
Mazowiecki, which has significant population and is the capital region of Poland and 
therefore a major driver of the national economy. On the other hand, the changes are not 
large compared with those in the EU15 where Greece, Portugal and Italy would be the only 
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countries with significant Convergence region coverage; the absence of Spain and Germany 
would have important implications for lobbying. 
Although most of the new Member States would retain Convergence status, growth rates 
have been high (compared to most of the EU15). This is especially so in the Baltic States 
and Slovakia (eg. Estonia, GNI 48.2% of EU27 in 2001-3 to 64.8% by 2005-7). As a result, 
other things being equal, convergence allocations would rise in those Member States 
affected by capping for 2007-13  in other words, even regions which are relatively more 
prosperous could receive higher allocations post-2013 owing to GDP growth and its impact 
on the absorption cap.  
All of those regions which would lose Convergence status on the basis of the EU27 average 
for 2003-5 would still be eligible for Convergence status if the EU15 average were used. In 
addition, most of the existing Phasing-out regions as well as a some current Phasing-in 
regions and some areas that are current not designated also have GDP per head below the 
EU15 75 percent threshold. These regions are included as Phasing-out areas in Figure 1.  
This mixed pattern of economic growth (with particularly poor performance in Italy, 
Portugal and Belgium) coupled with loss of convergence status in Germany, Spain and 
Greece, seems likely to fuel demands for generous transitional arrangements. 
For the Cohesion Fund, based on current data, the position is relatively stable (see Figure 
2). Based on 2005-7 data, Greece would lose Cohesion Fund eligibility, and thus only 
Portugal among old Member States would retain it. Based on current growth trajectories in 
relation to EU27 average, Cyprus and Slovenia are also likely to cease to qualify, although it 
is worth noting the precedent in Spanish eligibility under the current Financial Perspective. 
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Figure 2: GNI(PPS) per head (EU27=100) 
  2001-3 2002-4 2003-5 2004-6 2005-7 
CF 
2007-
13 
CF post 
2013? 
EU27 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   
Belgium 126.4 125.1 123.2 122.0 121.9   
Bulgaria 31.3 33.2 34.4 35.6 36.8 Y Y 
Czech Rep 69.0 69.9 71.7 73.0 74.6 Y Y 
Denmark 126.3 126.3 126.6 128.0 128.2   
Germany 115.8 116.3 116.8 116.5 116.0   
Estonia 48.2 51.4 55.6 60.2 64.8 Y Y 
Ireland 116.5 119.3 121.7 123.4 124.9   
Greece 90.1 92.0 93.1 94.5 95.7 Y ? 
Spain 99.2 100.1 100.8 101.9 102.6 [Y]  
France 116.1 113.9 112.6 112.3 112.1   
Italy 113.4 109.6 107.3 105.0 103.4   
Cyprus 87.1 87.2 88.1 88.7 89.5 Y Y 
Latvia 41.4 43.3 46.0 48.9 52.7 Y Y 
Lithuania 44.4 47.2 50.0 52.4 55.2 Y Y 
Lux 199.3 203.6 210.4 223.7 226.8   
Hungary 58.4 59.6 60.2 60.2 60.2 Y Y 
Malta 79.5 78.4 76.1 74.6 74.5 Y Y 
Neths 134.3 133.5 132.4 132.9 133.5   
Austria 126.6 127.6 127.9 127.3 127.2   
Poland 48.1 48.5 49.0 49.7 50.9 Y Y 
Portugal 75.9 75.3 74.6 73.4 72.6 Y Y 
Romania 29.4 30.9 32.7 35.0 37.1 Y Y 
Slovenia 80.9 82.6 84.3 86.0 87.6 Y Y 
Slovakia 53.3 54.1 55.8 58.9 62.8 Y Y 
Finland 115.0 115.5 115.4 117.4 118.3   
Sweden 122.5 123.8 124.4 125.4 126.1   
UK 121.3 123.2 123.1 121.8 120.0   
Source: Own calculations from DG ECFIN data. 
3.3 The Commission perspective 
The Commission has laid the basis for the debate on the future of Cohesion policy through 
the publication of the Fourth Cohesion Report and the launch of the public consultation. As 
yet, however, it has not presented any orientations or specific proposals for reform, 
although the consultation questions do provide some indication of the main parameters and 
direction of potential change. In addition, Commissioner Hübner has outlined some 
tentative and general ideas on the future of policy in various fora of reflection and debate, 
including Council Presidency meetings, policymaker seminars and public events. In 
reviewing this material, several main themes appear to underpin the Commissions current 
stance on the future of policy. 
First, regional development in Europe and the role of Cohesion policy must been seen 
within the context of global challenges. As outlined in the Fourth Cohesion Report, these 
include:  globalisation and the acceleration in economic restructuring as a result of the 
changing international division of labour; changes in the structure of the population which 
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is ageing and decreasing; territorial pressure of climate change; and the economic impact 
of energy prices. Commission views on the precise role and contribution that Cohesion 
policy can make to these challenges have not been articulated yet, although Commissioner 
Hübner clearly recognises that it cannot be the only instrument to address them:  
“ do not  get  me wrong – I do not  t hink t hat  cohesion pol icy should play t he main 
role in stopping global warming, al t hough it  has a cont ribut ion t o make. What  I 
mean here is t hat  we should view t he fut ure convergence of  our t errit ories in t he 
cont ext  of  t he fort hcoming global changes which inevit ably wil l  impact  more and 
more on t heir development .” 37
Further Commission thinking on this issue is anticipated to emerge at the end of 2008 when 
it publishes a report on scenarios of the socio-economic situation of the European regions 
with a 2020 time-frame, taking into account the dynamics of the global challenges and their 
implications.  
Second, Cohesion policy must be more focused on maximising it s impact  on EU 
compet it iveness, growt h and j obs. The Commission has consistently stressed that this does 
not imply a shift in the solidarity dimension of the policy rationale, which must continue to 
ensure that the distribution of resources is focused on poorer countries and regions, but 
that the allocation of resources is made more effective and efficient in achieving policy 
goals.38 In driving the competitiveness agenda, for instance, three general policy 
implications have been drawn out from the Commissions analytical work under the Fourth 
Cohesion Report and Fifth Progress Report:39
“ First ly, more focus on European high growt h sectors, such as business and 
f inancial  services or high t ech manufact uring indust ries, which play a signif icant  
role in t he convergence process wit hin t he Union. Secondly, we need pol icies, 
especial ly in t he regions lagging behind, which would accompany st i l l  ongoing 
rest ruct uring process, in part icular in agricul t ure. Final ly, we have t o address t he 
demands of  more t radit ional indust rial  sect ors, wit h t he obj ect ive of  encouraging 
t he shif t  t owards high product ivit y and high value added act ivit ies.”  
Also in line with the competitiveness drive, Commissioner Hübner has argued for the need 
for Cohesion policy to put more focus on public goods, especially of a European nature, 
through the creat ion of  ef f icient  inst it ut ional and business environment s and t hrough 
moving away f rom t he simple provision of  direct  aids.”  Typical areas of investment would 
include transport and communication infrastructures, information networks, R&D and 
entrepreneurship. The underlying aim is for Cohesion policy to function more “ as an 
                                                 
37 Danuta Hübner (2008) Ref lect ions on fut ure of  cohesion pol icy’  Conference on the future of 
cohesion policy organised by Slovenian Presidency, Maribor, 7 April 2008 
38 Danuta Hübner (2007) Speech on future of cohesion policy Informal Ministerial Meeting on 
Territorial Cohesion and Regional Policy, Punta Delgada, 24 November 2007, Azores, Portugal. 
39 Danuta Hübner (2008) Ref lect ions on fut ure of  cohesion pol icy’  Conference on the future of 
cohesion policy organised by Slovenian Presidency, Maribor, 7 April 2008 
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inst rument  of  economic regulat ion which addresses market  fai lures and which act s as a 
broker and a cat alyst  for change wit hout  subst it ut ing for t he market .” 40  
Third, changes are required to the governance of  Cohesion pol icy in order to increase the 
focus on performance, to optimise the roles of different actors and levels, and to improve 
the coordination of the funds.  
A key issue for the Commission is the need to make Cohesion policy more performance-
based and results-oriented. In this sense, mechanisms which can bet t er demonst rat e t he 
resul t s, impact  and value-added of  pol icy”  are required. 41 On the other hand, the 
Commission is conscious that t hat  f inding consensus around new evaluat ion crit eria and 
new set s indicat ors wil l  be a dif f icul t  t ask, not  least  due t o t he very diverse nat ure of  
regional economies.” 42 It is also acknowledged that a greater performance orientation 
would require changes to the Commissions present role. In particular, this would require 
better knowledge of the regions within the Commissions services and more emphasis to 
be given to support ing t he development  of  ef fect ive regional  development  st rategies and 
in disseminat ing good pract ice and experience.”  However, freeing up the necessary 
capacity and resources within the Commission to develop this advisory role would require a 
more fundamental revision in the current distribution of control and audit and control 
responsibilities. As argued by Commissioner Hübner:43
 “ We need a st ronger involvement  and responsibil i t y of  t he Member St ates in 
carrying t he cont rol  and audit  act ivit ies, while t he Commission should concent rate 
on cert i f ying and supervising t he funct ioning of  nat ional  cont rol  and audit  syst ems. 
This would al low t he Commission t o al locat e more resources t o pol icy advice and 
"performance audit " focusing on t he qual it y of  t he cohesion invest ment  in t erms of  
economic growt h, j obs and compet it iveness.”  
A strengthened role for local actors in the planning and implementation of programmes 
would also be welcomed by the Commission.44 This could be promoted “ by a more 
widespread use of  inst ruments such as local  grant s and governance mechanisms such as 
local  part nerships” 45.  Greater involvement of citizens is also sought.  
                                                 
40 Danuta Hübner (2007) Genuinely modern and st i l l  reinvent ing it sel f  speech to the Fourth Cohesion 
Forum, Brussels, 28 September 2007;  
41 Danuta Hübner (2008) EU regional  pol icy post -2013: more of  t he same, or a new beginning? Speech 
at European Policy Centre Breakfast Policy Briefing Brussels, 1 July, 2008 
42 Danuta Hübner (2008) ‘ Ref lect ions on fut ure of  cohesion pol icy’  Conference on the future of 
cohesion policy organised by Slovenian Presidency, Maribor, 7 April 2008 
43 Danuta Hübner speech at the Conference of CRPM and CoR, What future for regional policies after 
2013? Seville, 18 January 2008 
44 Danuta Hübner (2008), EU regional  pol icy post -2013: more of  t he same, or a new beginning? Speech 
at European Policy Centre Breakfast Policy Briefing Brussels, 1 July, 2008 
45 Danuta Hübner (2008) Ref lect ions on fut ure of  cohesion pol icy’  Conference on the future of 
cohesion policy organised by Slovenian Presidency, Maribor, 7 April 2008 
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A final issue on the governance theme is the need to re-think the way the Structural Funds 
are coordinated.46 Partly due to the increasing importance of the territorial cohesion 
theme, as well as criticism from the Member States, it is acknowledged by the Commission 
that improved coordination is needed between the different planning and implementing 
modes of the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund, as well between Cohesion policy and rural 
development.  
3.4 Member State Perspectives 
Turning to the responses of Member States to the Cohesion policy consultation, just over 
half of the Member States (18/EU27) made a formal submission. Some of those countries 
that did not respond have sketched out their views in presidency meetings (e.g. Austria, 
Luxembourg) and other fora. Most countries have welcomed the launch of the debate on 
the future of Cohesion policy, with some stressing that it must be seen within the context 
of the broader EU budget review debate. Not all have provided full responses to the 
consultation, preferring instead to outline general reflections given the present stage of the 
review process and due to the fact that it is still too early to assess the experience of the 
2007-13 period. 
3.4.1 Achievements and policy rat ionale 
In reviewing Member State perspectives on the achievements of Cohesion policy and its 
underlying principles and rationale, several issues emerge from the consultation responses 
and reform debate. First, solidarity is widely held up as a fundamental EU value which is 
being suitably applied through Cohesion policy, and that this expression of solidarity should 
not be put into question in the future (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovak Republic). Far from being a simple redistributive 
mechanism, however, Cohesion policy is regarded as having provided an effective 
instrument for combining the concept of solidarity with the promotion of competitiveness 
and sustainable development across the EU (Italy, Latvia, Spain).  
Second, there is broad agreement that Cohesion policy has made a positive contribution to 
the reduction of disparities across EU Member States and regions by promoting economic 
growth, employment and competitiveness (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Romania, Slovak Republic) - the UK position is less 
assertive, recognising a mixed picture with evidence of both success and failure regarding 
economic catch-up and convergence. To the extent that disparities across EU regions 
remain high, and given the ongoing existence of pressures contributing to regionally 
imbalanced development, the justification for maintaining an active Cohesion policy at the 
EU level is widely considered to be strong.  
Third, there is a recognition by some countries that the economic benefits of Cohesion 
policy do not accrue solely to the poorer regions and Member States of the EU, but also 
spread to the more prosperous parts, contributing to economic growth and employment 
                                                 
46 Ibid 
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throughout all Member States (Bulgaria, Italy) and promoting the realisation of their 
broader economic interests concerning market integration (Italy, Slovak Republic). This 
view, for instance, strongly underlines the Polish position: 
“ The Cohesion Pol icy is benef icial  not  only for least  developed count ries and 
regions, but  for t he ent ire EU. We can easily ident if y many result s of  t he pol icy 
wit hout  which t he more developed regions and Member St at es couldn’ t  ful f i l  t heir 
int erest s on t he Single European Market , such as: t he development  of  t he pan-
European t ransport  inf rast ruct ure and consequent ly t he improvement  of  t he 
spat ial  mobil i t y, t he movement  of  workers and goods, t he t ransfer of  knowledge 
and new technologies et c. In t his context , t he awareness related t o t he Cohesion 
Pol icy role as a “ pol icy for Europe”  needs t o be st ressed and enhanced.”  
Related, several Member States have highlighted various political, economic, social and 
geo-political benefits arising from the role of Cohesion policy as a European integration 
promoting tool, such as contributing to the creation and development of the single market 
(Finland, Germany, Poland, Portugal), the single currency (Portugal), successive waves of 
enlargement (Portugal) and broader stability (Finland).  
Fourth, beyond the contribution to EU-level objectives and goals, Cohesion policy is 
recognised as having had important positive influences on a range of domestic institutions, 
processes and policies, including: 
x the promotion of integrated, multi-annual programming (Belgium, Finland, Poland, 
Portugal); 
x increased partnership working (Belgium, Finland, Portugal); 
x improved strategic and operational management systems and working methods 
(Belgium, Finland, Poland, Portugal); 
x greater networking, cooperation and exchange of best practices (Finland); 
x improved financial management and control (Poland, Slovenia); 
x increased monitoring and evaluation (Belgium, Slovak Republic, Poland, Portugal); 
x promoting area-based approaches to economic development (Slovak Republic); and 
x stimulating financial leverage (Belgium, Slovak Republic). 
Last, looking to the future there is an increasing recognition of the need for Cohesion policy 
to be more firmly targeted on European added value - as with the broader EU budget  with 
support more firmly focused on areas where Community action is necessary (Germany) or 
more effective than through national action alone (Czech Republic). Notwithstanding the 
increased salience of this issue in recent years, added value is still considered by some to 
be insufficiently addressed in the discussions (Austria). A useful first step, as suggested in 
the German response, could be for Member States and European institutions to agree on a 
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common definition of European added value. Within the context of the added value debate, 
similar concerns have arisen regarding the idea of focusing Cohesion policy on European 
public goods, an idea which is being increasingly deployed in the Cohesion policy reform 
discussions, not least by the European Commission, but is considered to remain under-
developed in conceptual and operational terms (Austria, Belgium, Latvia, Slovak Republic)  
3.4.2 Objectives and priorit ies 
(i) Territ orial  cohesion 
The enshrining of territorial cohesion in the Lisbon Treaty as a core EU objective has been 
accepted by all Member States. Beyond this general agreement at the level of principles, 
the implications of this Treaty modification for the substance of Cohesion policy remains 
disputed and open to debate. The lack of a commonly agreed definition of territorial 
cohesion and the need for further conceptual operationalisation is an issue of concern for 
several Member States (Bulgaria, Latvia, Poland, Portugal).  In this context, some countries 
support the development of indicators (Bulgaria, France, Poland) and other tools of 
territorial analysis (Belgium) in order to contribute to a better understanding of the 
concept and its potential application.  The publication of the Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion and the related consultation exercise are seen as being important in this respect. 
Member State views are more divided over the implications of territorial cohesion for the 
scope of Cohesion policy, financial allocations and the related responsibilities of different 
territorial levels. The UK response is arguably the most resistant to change, stating that:  
“ The addit ion of  t errit orial  cohesion t o t he t reat y does not  extend t he compet ence 
of  Cohesion Pol icy but  formal ises t he work t hat  is already being undert aken; one 
example of  which are act ions carried out  t hrough t he Cooperat ion Obj ect ive”  
In a similar way, the German position makes it clear that spatial development continues to 
remain an exclusive Member State responsibility and, moreover, that the domestic 
distribution of powers must be duly respected. Although the German position recognises 
that the territorial dimension of policy should increase in the future in line with the Treaty 
changes, this is seen largely as being a matter for each Member State and region to 
determine for themselves through specific territorial interventions or the spatial targeting 
of funding according to their particular needs. Partly in line with this perspective, it has 
been proposed that territorial cohesion could be used as element for reinforcing an 
integrated approach to regional development programming (Czech Republic, Italy) 
preferably at the regional level (Germany).  
A contrasting view is provided by a group of Member States which seem to support 
territorial cohesion as a means to provide additional measures and/or greater recognition 
through Cohesion policy to development challenges associated with specific territorial 
features that are generally prominent in their respective countries. These include sparsely 
populated regions (Finland), outermost regions or islands (France, Greece, Spain), rural 
areas with low population density (Spain), towns bordering other continents (Spain) or 
mountainous areas (France, Greece). More general types of territorial and/or thematic 
intervention proposed for targeted support include the balanced development and 
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integration of urban and rural areas (Czech Republic, Poland), improving the accessibility of 
rural and peripheral territories (Czech Republic) urban development (Belgium, Czech 
Republic) and the promotion of an integrated and polycentric approach to city development 
(Czech Republic). On the other hand, some Member States stress that such territorial 
specificities should not influence geographical eligibility and funding flows (Germany, 
Netherlands) or put into question the central and traditional goals of cohesion and 
solidarity which underpin the policy (Bulgaria, Netherlands). 
Where there is more agreement across Member States is on the significant added value 
provided by territorial cooperation (Finland, France, Germany, Romania, Spain, UK). 
Several countries have called for strengthened cooperation between regions across all 
strands of the territorial cooperation Objective (Czech Republic, Poland), through the 
mainstream programmes (Romania, Spain), and externally by better coordination with the 
neighbourhood instrument and enlargement policies (France, Luxembourg). In terms of 
budgetary allocations, Poland goes a step further by calling for an increased share of the 
budget to be dedicated to this objective. However, several countries also note ongoing 
concerns regarding the complexity of the rules for implementing territorial cooperation 
programmes (Austria, Malta, Poland). 
(i i) Spat ial  el igibi l i t y, priorit y and crit eria 
In line with its Treaty basis, there is widespread agreement that economic and social 
cohesion should remain the primary objective of Cohesion policy with the key focus of 
support on the less-developed regions and (for some) countries (Finland, Belgium, Czech 
Republic, Spain, Germany, Bulgaria, Latvia, Netherlands, Romania, Lithuania). While most 
Member States have yet to present views on the distribution of funding allocations at this 
stage in the process, Romania has called for increased resources (in terms of support per 
inhabitant) for the most lagging countries and regions, while Germany has expressed a 
preference for extensive concentration of funding in the new Member States.  
Outside the poorest countries/regions, some countries have expressed support for a smaller 
share of funding to be available for all EU regions in order to promote competitiveness and 
jobs (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Lithuania) and maintain the visibility of the EU across all 
Member States (Germany). By contrast, Latvia has noted concern about the consequences 
of excessive geographical coverage for the sustainability of the policy:  
“ Making t he pol icy aims t oo broad and referable t o al l  member st ates or regions 
can make t hem become too ambit ious, unachievable and, hence, t here might  arise 
an idea not  t o f inance t he pol icy anymore.”  
With regard to eligibility and financial allocation criteria, several countries are keen to 
retain the focus on GDP (PPS) per capita (Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania), with firm 
opposition to the use of other territorial/geographical criteria expressed by at least one 
Member State (Germany). On the other hand, some countries appear to be more open to 
the idea of exploring the use of additional indicators for allocating expenditure, such as GNI 
per capita, wage levels, mortality rates, infrastructure-related indicators (Latvia), or other 
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indicators used by the Commission in its Fourth Cohesion Report, such as sectoral GDP, 
employment/unemployment rates, R&D expenditure rates etc (Romania).  
The issue of transitional arrangements has not featured prominently in the majority of 
Member State submissions. Two exceptions are Spain, which stresses the need for 
appropriate phasing-out support for the least developed regions, and Germany, which 
argues for equality of treatment for all transitional regions irrespective of the country in 
which they are located.  
(i i i) Themat ic priorit ies and new development  chal lenges 
Key questions in the reform debate concern how Cohesion policy should be adapted to take 
account of EU objectives and broader global developments with potentially increasing and 
asymmetric impacts on the EU economy in the years ahead.   
On the first question, there is widespread support among Member States for continued, if 
not increased, alignment of Cohesion policy with the major objectives and strategic 
development priorities of the EU through the Lisbon Strategy (Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, 
Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK). However, a number of concerns have been 
raised. 
x The traditional developmental goals of Cohesion policy, targeting the poorest 
countries and regions, should not be compromised (Lithuania, Czech Republic), 
particularly given that the Lisbon objectives are not always appropriate for 
Convergence regions (Latvia, Lithuania). 
x There is a need for a clearer separation of goals and responsibilities, avoiding, for 
instance, unnecessary duplication between the National Reform Programmes and 
the National Strategic Reference Frameworks (Belgium, UK). 
x There should be better integration of the Gothenburg strategy and sustainable 
development (France), which has been relatively neglected due to the overriding 
concern with Lisbon goals. 
x With regards to the earmarking exercise, the approach to expenditure 
categorisation is overly prescriptive, with a lack of clarity over what expenditure 
was covered by the categories, thus requiring a more flexible approach for the 
future that accommodates national and regional specificities (Lithuania, Malta, 
Romania, UK). 
There is no consensus on the role of Cohesion policy in addressing major challenges such as 
globalisation, climate change, demographic change and energy security. Several responses 
have emerged to this question:  
x recognition that Cohesion policy needs to take account of these issues (Austria, 
Estonia, Greece, Italy) or can make a contribution (Malta, Poland, Portugal), 
particularly where there are regional implications (Belgium, Greece);  
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x the need for more detailed investigation and analysis on how, and to what extent, 
Cohesion policy can contribute to addressing these challenges (Bulgaria, France, 
Greece, Germany, Latvia);  
x that Cohesion policy should not lose sight of its core objective of reducing 
disparities in development as laid down in the Treaty (Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Netherlands, UK), particularly given the significant widening of disparities resulting 
from the last two enlargements (Bulgaria) and the relatively limited budget 
available to Cohesion policy (Latvia, UK); 
x recognition of the already significant effort made by Cohesion policy towards 
tackling the key development challenges faced by the EU, Member States and 
regions (Austria, Italy, Germany, UK); and 
x that some of the challenges should be primarily addressed through domestic 
policies (Germany) or by other EU sectoral policies but with better coordination 
with Cohesion policy (Poland).  
3.4.3 Management and delivery  
(i) Simpl if icat ion, proport ional it y and subsidiarit y  
In reviewing their experiences with the management and delivery of Cohesion policy, a 
large number of Member States have revealed significant dissatisfaction with the 
complexity and administrative burdens involved and pointed to the need for change, 
particularly by applying the principles of simplification and proportionality to a more 
meaningful extent than has been the case to date (Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, UK). To take one example, the 
submission of Romania clearly illustrates some of the frustrations involved: 
“ Of t en, t he quest  for simpl if icat ion has led t o t he opposit e resul t ,  giving rise t o 
complicat ions or simply replacing cert ain exist ing rules wit h ot her rules j ust  as 
cumbersome as t he previous ones…bot h t he Communit y acquis and t he nat ional 
legislat ions have become more and more complex, e.g. st ate aid rules, publ ic 
procurement , environment al  impact , complex procedures and t echnical  st andards 
and so on pose many dif f icul t ies t o t he proj ect s and of t en generat e maj or delays in 
implementat ion (in t he cont ext  of  t he n+2 rule). For t he next  programming period, 
t he Commission and t he Member St at es have t o ident if y solut ions for real 
simpl if icat ion, in order t o make t he pol icy’ s del ivery more ef fect ive.”   
The most burdensome area of policy administration identified by the Member States 
concerns the rules on financial management, audit and control. These are viewed as being 
overly complex (UK), disproportionately costly to implement (Latvia), unfairly applied (e.g. 
in a retrospective fashion or with different interpretations by different EU institutions) (UK) 
and are considered to strangle innovation in programme management due to the 
increasing rigour with which the rules are being enforced (Austria). Proposals for reform 
noted by several countries range from identifying further scope for simplification, while 
maintaining a high standard of financial control (Estonia, UK) or a wider application of the 
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principle of proportionality (Austria, Germany, Lithuania, Luxembourg) to a more 
fundamental review of how the responsibility for management and control is shared 
between the Community and the national level (Finland).  
Considering the allocation of responsibilities between different levels, various Member 
States acknowledged subsidiarity as the guiding principle to underpin future reforms to the 
management of Cohesion policy (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, 
Malta, Portugal, Romania). In most cases, however, the principle of subsidiarity is not 
further elaborated upon or only appears to be interpreted as providing additional flexibility 
to the Member States, rather than providing for competencies to be assigned to the 
optimum level for solving the issue at hand.  For instance, the German position states that 
compl iance wit h t he principle of  subsidiarit y must  play an import ant  role and any 
st rat egies t hat  permit  t he f lexible use of  St ructural  Funds at  a Member-St at e level  wit hin 
a common f ramework clearly def ined by al l  Members St ates are welcomed, while the 
submission of Malta notes that “ each Member Stat e should be lef t  t o i t s own decisions wit h 
regard t o t he opt imum level of  decent ral isat ion of  funct ions/ responsibi l i t ies. This is part  
of  subsidiarit y.”  By contrast, one area identified by Estonia for increasing the role of the 
Commission concerns its strategic advisory capacity for advising the regions and in 
distributing more widely the horizontal knowledge it has, especially in terms of achieving a 
greater impact of the expenditure from the funds.   
(i i) Improving performance  
For some Member States, there is a concern with making Cohesion policy more performance 
and results oriented. Although how this is to be achieved remains underdeveloped, some 
tentative suggestions included in the submissions include:  
x strengthening the focus on outcomes and results (Estonia, Lithuania) by placing 
increased focus on development targets (Portugal) with appropriate performance 
conditionalities and incentives (Italy); 
x increased selectivity and concentration on effective interventions with maximum 
impact (Germany, Italy) and which are more cost-efficient (Germany); 
x strengthening the additionality principle by encouraging it to be used as an 
economic policy instrument instead of a regulatory obligation (Italy); 
x strengthened monitoring and evaluation (Bulgaria, Germany, Poland Portugal), such 
as greater use of impact assessment (Latvia, Lithuania) and the development of 
more complex indicators with a longer-term time frame and incorporating both 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions (Poland); and 
x greater exchange of experiences and knowledge between regions on policy impact 
(Estonia). 
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(i i i) Pol icy coordinat ion 
Policy coordination and integration is mentioned by a number of Member States in 
connection with improved management of Cohesion policy. Within this context, an aspect 
of the 2006 reforms which has been strongly criticised by a number of Member States 
concerns the adoption of a mono-fund approach for programmes and the separation of the 
rural development fund from the Structural Funds. These decisions are viewed as having 
generated substantial difficulties for policy integration (Italy), to have increased 
departmental compartmentalisation (Latvia) and to have not delivered any substantive 
simplification in the practice of programming (Lithuania). Responding to these issues, there 
is broad agreement of the need to reinforce the integration of Cohesion policy in the future 
and to minimise the bureaucracy involved in planning. A range of options have been 
proposed, including:  
x abandoning the mono-fund split between ERDF and ESF OPs (Poland);  
x reintegrating rural development policy into the Structural Funds (Latvia);  
x creating  a single, unified fund (Latvia);  
x eliminating the Cohesion Fund and integrating its contents within mainstream 
Structural Funds or clearly differentiated it from the ERDF in terms of eligibility 
criteria (Germany); 
x integrating the globalisation adjustment fund into the ESF (Germany); 
x coordinating and integrating the planning and implementation systems of the 
Structural and Cohesion Funds more closely together, as well as with the FIFG and, 
particularly, the EARDF (Czech Republic, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic).  
Another form of reinforced policy coordination and integration called for by a number of 
countries is between Cohesion policy and other EU policies with a view to enhancing 
synergies, minimising duplication and, where relevant, to simplify funding application 
processes for beneficiaries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Malta). Specific 
policy areas highlighted include education, research, innovation and the environment 
(Finland, Germany, Italy).  
Lastly, better integration of Cohesion policy with national policies is viewed as desirable by 
some Member States (Bulgaria, France, Italy).  With this objective in mind, the most radical 
suggestion has come from Estonia, which proposes to allow:  
“ t he best  performing regions t o use t he funds by support ing t heir already exist ing 
regional development  plans, inst ead of  set t ing up paral lel  ones, relying on t he 
exist ing implement at ion mechanisms and rules in t hose regions while respect ing 
t he EU legislat ion. This opt ion, nat ural ly, has t o be based on conf idence and an 
excel lent  t rack record of  t he regions while ensuring t hat  t he f inancial  int erest s of  
t he European Union are secured.”  
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4. DISCUSSION ISSUES 
On the basis of the review of the budget and Cohesion policy consultations in this report, 
this final section identifies some questions/issues as a starting point for discussion at the 
EoRPA meeting. 
a) What role for Cohesion policy in dealing with new challenges? The outcome of the 
budget consultation suggests considerable agreement among Member States on the 
priorities for the European Union  research, innovation and action to deal with the 
consequences of climate change. However, the role of Cohesion policy is much more 
contested. On the one hand, there is widespread support for continued, if not 
increased, alignment of Cohesion policy with the major objectives and strategic 
development priorities of the EU through the Lisbon Strategy. On the other hand, there 
is no consensus on the role of Cohesion policy in addressing major challenges such as 
globalisation, climate change, demographic change and energy security.  What is the 
scope for Cohesion policy to support EU objectives in dealing with new challenges? 
What are the limits to Cohesion policy intervention? 
b) How to judge the added value of EU intervention? The single most important principle 
for Member States, in their responses to the budget review and the Cohesion policy 
consultation, is the need for EU policies to demonstrate European added value. There 
are, however, quite different interpretations. What does added value mean in a 
Cohesion policy context? How should it be defined? What added value can be 
determined from national experiences of implementing Cohesion policy? 
c) How can the management and implementation of Cohesion policy be improved? For 
several years, there has been increasing criticism from Member States concerning the 
problems experienced with management and implementation of Cohesion policy. The 
rules on financial management, audit and control are clearly of particular concern. In 
their responses to the consultation, Member States advocated better application of the 
principles of simplification, proportionality and subsidiarity. What would this mean in 
practice? What are the priorities for improving the current implementation system? 
Specifically on the distribution of responsibilities, what is the optimum allocation of 
responsibilities between the Commission, Member States and regions? Is there scope for 
operating a more devolved system?  
d) How might a more performance-based Cohesion policy operate? Many Member States 
appear to support a more performance or results-based Cohesion policy. However, the 
experience hitherto with initiatives such as performance reserve, the decommitment 
rule and earmarking  which have sought to define the financial or physical outcomes of 
programmes more precisely  have encountered resistance or practical difficulties. The 
experiences with monitoring and evaluation have also been mixed. How could Cohesion 
policy become more performance based? Are there lessons from Member States? 
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